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This article reviews significant legal developments during 2017 in
international

anti-money laundering

in the areas

of money services

businesses, art, banking, gaming, personal liability, and broker dealers.
I.

Introduction

Money laundering and terrorist financing continue to present challenges
for regulators worldwide. The Basel ANIL Index 2017 Report (the index),
which ranks countries according to their risk of money laundering and
terrorist financing, identified only one low-risk country in the worldFinland.' One hundred countries fell into the medium-risk category; fiftytwo countries were identified as high risk.2 The United States ranked just
within the thirty lowest-risk countries for its strong anti-money laundering
(AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) frameworks.3
The index demonstrates that no country is immune from AML/CFI" risk
because criminals continue to seek out new ways to launder ill-gotten gains.4
It should also come as no surprise that those countries with strong public
and financial transparency and low levels of corruption have lower risk
scores.- But many lower-risk countries that have a strong presence in the
global financial markets, like the United States and the United Kingdom
(UK), continue to be a significant source of transactions involving laundered
funds, despite having relatively strong AML/CFT regulatory programs.
The Administration changes in the U.S. did not significantly slow the
pace of regulatory enforcement actions, especially those concerning ANIL
laws. In fact, U.S. regulatory agencies renewed their commitment to ANIL
and CFI' oversight in 2017. In October 2016, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance addressing cybercrime
that expanded suspicious activity reporting requirements to now include
1. BASEL INST. ON GOVERNANCE, BASEL AML INDEX 2017 REPORT 1 (2017), available at
https://index.baselgovernance.org/sites/index/documents/Basel-AML-Index-ReDort-201 7.pdf.
2. Id. at 17.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 4.
5. Id. at 3.
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cyber-events.6 Accordingly, financial institutions are directed to report
known or suspected transactions by, at, or through the institution that
involve or aggregate to $5,000 or more in funds or other assets. In addition,
the guidance encourages the voluntary reporting of cyber-events that may
not otherwise require a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR). Examples of
cyber-events provided by FinCEN include malware attacks, Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and unauthorized access to an institution's
network.7
Financial institutions are encouraged to incorporate cyber-related
information in their Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) /AML monitoring efforts,
coordinate communication between ANIL and cyber security units within an
organization, and share cyber-related information between financial
institutions. FinCEN asserts that the sharing of malware signatures, IP
addresses, and virtual currency addresses can help identify the
cybercriminals linked to money laundering and terrorist financing. To this
end, "Section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act extends a safe harbor from
liability to financial institutions that voluntarily share information with one
another for the purpose of identifying and [] reporting potential money
laundering or terrorist activities. "s
Much like FinCEN, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) also intensified ANIL
oversight this year. Although ANIL compliance has been an SEC
examination priority for years, there was a significant increase in AML
related enforcement actions in 2017, particularly against broker-dealers. 9
FINRA's increased ANIL enforcement this year not only included brokersdealers but also targeted AML officers as well.10 Several U.S. enforcement
actions this year support the emerging trend to hold compliance
professionals personally liable for BSA/AML deficiencies and violations.
In the European Union, the two-year implementation period for member
states to achieve full compliance with the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering
Directive (AMLD4) concluded on June 25, 2017. AMLD4's emphasis on
enhanced customer due diligence, ultimate beneficial ownership, and
6.

FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,

Institutions on

FIN-2016-A005, Advisory to

Cyber-Events and Cyber-Enabled Crime

1

(2016),

Financial
available at https://

www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2016-a005.
7. Id at 5-6.
8. Id. at 8; See FinancialCrimes Enforcement Network, Section 314(b) Fact Sheet, (2016), available
at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/314bfactsheet.pdf.
9. See David Axelrod, Peter Hardy, Priya Roy and Brad Gershel, The SEC's New Enforcement
Tool?, LAW 360, (July 12, 2017, 12:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/943332; See also
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAmINATIONS, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Examination Prioritiesfor 2017 (2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities- 2017.pdf.
10. See Robert Axelrod, PersonalLiability Exposure for AML Compliance Officers: Lessons From
Haider, BLOOMBERG BNA, (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/personal-liability-exposuren57982087704/.
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evidenced-based risk methodology strengthened the existing rules in the
fight against money laundering."
Although banking cases account for a majority of the significant
enforcement actions in 2017, regulators worldwide continue to scrutinize
the rapidly evolving landscape of digital currency and efforts of money
services businesses and broker-dealers to comply with AMIL/CFI'
regulations.

II.

Money Services Businesses

A.

BTC-E

On July 26, 2017, FinCEN announced a $110 million fine against BTC-e,
a digital currency exchange, for willfully violating U.S. ANIL laws, and
another $12 million civil monetary penalty against its owner and operator,
Alexander Vinnik, a Russian national. This is FinCEN's second
enforcement action against a virtual currency exchange.12 BTC-e a/k/a
Canton Business Corporation is an Internet-based foreign entity operating
as a money serviced business (MSB). FinCEN's jurisdiction extends to
foreign MSBs that conduct business as an MSB "wholly or in substantial part
within the U.S."' 3 Customers located within the United States used BTC-e
to conduct tens of thousands of virtual currency transactions. Further,
BTC-e transactions were processed through servers located in the U.S.' 4
Among other significant failures, BTC-e did not have an ANIL program
and had never filed a single SAR. BTC-e's Know Your Customer (KYC)
program was inadequate; customers created accounts with minimal
information and customer verification policies were optional. BTC-e lacked
adequate internal controls to mitigate the inherent risks of virtual currencies.
In fact, BTC-e serviced currencies that anonymized user data or obfuscated
transactions and users openly discussed conducting criminal activity in
BTC-e user chat rooms. 5
FinCEN determined that BTC-e and Vinnik willfully violated money
service business requirements by failing to register as a MSB within 180 days
of beginning operations or to appoint a U.S.-based agent to accept legal
process, a requirement for MSBs located abroad. Although this was the first
11. Council Directive 2015/849, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73.
12. In 2015, FinCEN, in its first enforcement action against a virtual currency company, fined

Ripple Labs Inc., for willful violation of ant-money laundering laws. FinCENFines Ripple Labs
Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency Exchanger, FINCEN, (May 5,
2015), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-fines-ripple-labs-inc-first-civilenforcement-action-against-virtual.
13. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services
Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43585-01 (July 21, 2011).
14. In the Matter of: BTC-e a/k/a Canton Business Corporation and Alexander Vinnik, Number
2017-03, p. 3 (July 26, 2017), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/
enforcement action/2017-07-27/Assessmento20foro20BTCeVinniko20FINAL2.pdf.
15. Id.
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time FinCEN initiated an enforcement action against a foreign-based
money service business, it delivered a concrete message that the regulator
would hold money transmitters accountable for willfully violating U.S. AML
laws, even if they are located abroad.16
B.

WESTERN UNION

On January 19, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a
settlement with The Western Union Company (Western Union) whereby
Western Union, the DOJ, and several United States Attorney's Offices
agreed to a deferred prosecution agreement (the DPA) relating to the federal
government's charges of (i) a deficient anti-money laundering program and
(ii) aiding and abetting wire fraud. 17 As part of a global settlement, Western
Union also agreed to a stipulated order for permanent injunction and final
judgment (the Order) entered by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
federal agency focused on protecting consumers from anticompetitive,
deceptive, and unfair business practices, concerning charges asserted against
Western Union relating to consumer fraud.I 8
According to the DPA, Western Union "(1) willfully fail[ed] to implement
an effective anti-money laundering program, in violation of Title 31, United
States Code, Sections 5318(h) and 5322 and regulations issued thereunder;
and (2) aid[ed] and abet[ted] wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Sections 1343 and 2."'9 The conduct at issue chiefly related to
Western Union's agent locations and how Western Union failed to address
agents and locations that violated the Bank Secrecy Act.20 The DPA's
Statement of Facts states that Western Union employees "repeatedly
identiffied] Western Union Agent locations involved in or facilitating fraudrelated transactions but knowingly fail[ed] to take effective corrective
action."21 The schemes described in the Statement of Facts spanned
numerous countries, including but not limited to Spain, the United
Kingdom, China, and Mexico.22
Western Union is a MSB subject to specific registration and compliance
regulatory requirements issued by FinCEN.23 Western Union uses an
electronic money transfer system that enables consumers to send money to
16. See id.
17. See United States v. The Western Union Co., no. 1:17-00011 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2017)
(Deferred Prosecution Agreement). *located at URL https://ecf.pamd.uscourts.gov/docl/
15505767889.
18. See FederalTrade Commission v. The Western Union Co., No. 1:17-cv-00110 (M.D. Pa. Jan.
20, 2017) (Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment). *located at URL
https://ecf.pamd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/DktRpt.pl?104534454713954-L1l1.
19. Supra note.17.
20. Id.
21. Id. at Attachment A- Statement of Facts.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210 (2011).
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individuals worldwide.24 In fact, almost 90% of Western Union agent
locations are outside the United States.25 Western Union incorporates
several types of agents, but most are independent individuals or entities that
have a contractual relationship with Western Union.26 Unfortunately, MSBs
are often a target for financial crime. For instance, a Western Union
customer might only generate a single transaction, as compared with a
traditional financial institution's customers for whom a bank can engage in
ongoing Know Your Customer due diligence. In fact, as recently as March
of 2016, FinCEN issued guidance on how a MSB should monitor its agents
to prevent the use of the MSB as a facilitator of money laundering and
7
terrorist finance.2
With respect to the aiding and abetting charge, Western Union agreed to
forfeit $586 million on the basis that those funds are consumer fraud
proceeds traceable to violations of Title 18.28 The DPA gives credit to
Western Union for numerous compliance program enhancements made
since 2012.29 The DPA also sets forth elements that comprise a reasonably
designed anti-money laundering and anti-fraud program at Western
Union.30 For example, Western Union agreed to design and implement a
risk-based Know Your Agent program, as well as to design and maintain
procedures for corrective actions against agents and assign AML compliance
officers for each country designated by Western Union as high risk for fraud
or money laundering.31
It is significant for purposes of AML enforcement that the FTC, rather
than the DOJ, required the appointment of an independent compliance
auditor for Western Union. The Order sets forth various categories of
compliance requirements for Western Union, including prohibiting business
activities such as "[t]ransmitting a money transfer that [Western Union]
knows or reasonably should know is a fraud-induced money transfer;"
requiring due diligence on potential and current Western Union agents,
thereby prohibiting Western Union from "[flailing to ensure that all new
Western Union agents have effective policies and procedures in place at each
of the agent's locations to detect and prevent fraud-induced money
transfers"; and requiring monitoring compliance of Western Union agents,
thereby prohibiting Western Union from "[flailing to provide appropriate
and adequate ongoing education and training on consumer fraud for all
24. See supra note 17.
25. Id. at 3.
26. See id.
27.See FINANcIAL

CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,

FIN-2016-G001, Guidance or Existing

AML ProgramRule Compliance Obligations for MSB Principals with Respect to Agent Monitoring 1
(2016), available at https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisories/fincen-advisory-fin-2016-a005.
28. See supra note 17.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Id.
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Western Union agents."32 Failure to comply with the terms of the Order
could expose Western Union to prosecution.
Following the FTC settlement with MoneyGram International, Inc.,
another MSB subject to the DOJ and FTC charges, 33 it appears that the
34
FTC will continue to take an active part in cases involving ANIL violations.
Independent compliance auditors appointed pursuant to charges brought
under consumer protection laws will review, analyze, and report on the
efficacy of a defendant's anti-fraud program, with a particular focus on
fraud-induced money transfers. 35 In cases like that of Western Union or
MoneyGram, such a program could overlap or even exceed a defendant's
ANIL requirements under the BSA.
Further, although an ANIL program for an MSB is effective when it is
"reasonably designed to prevent the [MSB] from being used to facilitate
money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities,"36 the Order
requires extremely specific detail relating to the type of data Western Union
must obtain and retain with respect to fraud-induced money transfers. This
is in addition to the type of transactional data analysis that the company
must conduct to determine whether the agent location has "displayed any
unusual or suspicious money transfer activity that cannot reasonably be
explained or justified" such as "[u]nusual demographic activity" and
"[i]rregular concentrations of send and/or pay activity between the agent and
37
one or more other Western Union agent locations."

III. Art
A.

HOBBY LOBBY

On July 5, 2017, Hobby Lobby, the privately-held company famous for
securing a Supreme Court decision permitting it to deny health insurance
coverage for contraception to female employees on the basis that providing
such coverage violated the owners' personal religious beliefs, entered into a
settlement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New
York for violating federal law prohibiting the importation of falsely
identified cultural property. 38 In addition to the fine, Hobby Lobby also
agreed to forfeit thousands of ancient cuneiform tablets and clay bullae (clay
32. Supra note 18.
33. FTC v. MoneyGram International, Inc., No. 09-6576 (N.D. Ill., Stipulated Order for
Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment, October 21, 2009).
34. The FTC alleged that MoneyGram's worldwide network was being used by telemarketing
fraudsters to prey on U.S. customers and that MoneyGram ignored warnings from both law
enforcement and its own employees about the fraud.
35. Supra note 18 at *4; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) & § 6101-08).
36. See 31 C.F.R. § 1022.210 (2011).
37. Supra note 18.
38. Alan Feuer, Hobby Lobby Agrees to Forfeit 5,500 Artifacts Smuggled Out of Iraq, N. Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/nyregion!hobby-lobby-artifacts-smuggleiraq.html.
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balls with imprinted seals) originating in the region that is now Iraq.39 The
artifacts were shipped from Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in
boxes falsely labeled as "ceramic tiles" or "tile samples."40 The case had been
pending resolution for some time; Hobby Lobby's owners purchased the
artifacts beginning in December 2010, for a total of $1.6 million.41
According to the press release and civil in rem forfeiture complaint, the
violations were not inadvertent. As the press release noted, the "acquisition
of the Artifacts was fraught with red flags."42 Before the acquisition, in July
2010, the company's president and a consultant travelled to the United Arab
Emirates to view the artifacts. Although at least two Israeli dealers and a
UAE dealer attended the inspection, the Israeli dealers later told Hobby
Lobby personnel that the items belonged to the family of a third Israeli
dealer. Later, the company was provided with a provenance certificate
claiming the artifacts had been in the United States in the 1970s, in the
custody of yet another individual, but the company took no steps to verify
that information, which was apparently inaccurate because the alleged
custodian had not met the third Israeli dealer until 2007, and never stored
43
any items for him.
Significantly, an expert retained by Hobby Lobby wrote a memorandum
to Hobby Lobby's in-house counsel that was not shared with others in the
company involved in the transactions. The memorandum warned the
company against purchasing artifacts from Iraq, and that the company
should ensure that all shipping documents were accurate, that there was a
high risk that the items would be detained by U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol (Customs), and that the failure to accurately identify the country of
origin could lead to seizure of the items. The expert further warned that the
objects may have been looted from Iraq and that, if so, their acquisition
would have violated U.S. law. 44 Despite these warnings, Hobby Lobby made
the purchases through multiple intermediaries.
Hobby Lobby appears to have gone out of its way not to perform due
diligence, not to comply with its own acquisition and compliance protocols,
and to conduct the transactions in the most suspicious manner possible.
Hobby Lobby did not investigate records supplied by two of the three Israeli
dealers concerning the provenance of the artifacts. Additionally, at the
request of one dealer, it wired payments to seven personal accounts
belonging to five people, none of whom was the purported seller listed on
39. Id.

40. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office E. D. N. Y., United States Files Civil Action to Forfeit
Thousands of Ancient Iraqi Artifacts Imported by Hobby Lobby (July 5, 2017) available at https://
www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/united-states-files-civil-action-forfeit-thousands-ancient-iraqiartifacts -imported.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Complaint in Rem, United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty Ancient Cuneiform
Tablets andApproximately Three Thousand Ancient Clay Bullae, CV 17-3980 (E. D. N. Y. June 5,
2017).

44. Id.
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the invoice and bypassed its internal international department, which
routinely conducted foreign transactions and which had noted that the items
might be held by U.S. Customs. Further, Hobby Lobby caused the artifacts
to be falsely labeled as to their country of origin, value, and description;
directed the shipper to falsely claim on the customs declaration forms that
the items were valued below the $2,000 reporting threshold; and at the
direction of the UAE-based dealer, addressed the shipments to Hobby
Lobby and two affiliates, to make it appear as though these were legitimate
45
transactions.
After U.S. Customs seized five shipments and began administrative
forfeiture proceedings, Hobby Lobby's counsel requested the initiation of
judicial forfeiture. Following extensive negotiations, the parties settled the
case. In addition to agreeing to forfeit the artifacts identified in the
complaint, and pay a fine of $3 million, Hobby Lobby "agreed to adopt
internal policies and procedures governing its importation and purchase of
cultural property, provide appropriate training to its personnel, hire
qualified outside customs counsel and customs brokers, and submit quarterly
reports to the government on any cultural property acquisitions for the next
eighteen months."46
IV.

Banking Cases

A.

DEUTSCHE BANK

In January 2017, the New York Department of Financial Services
(NYDFS) entered into a consent order with Deutsche Bank AG and its New
York branch for violations of New York AML laws in connection with a
"mirror trading" scheme among the bank's branches in New York, London,
and Russia that resulted in the movement of approximately $10 billion out of
Russia. The NYDFS concluded that the bank's compliance failures resulted
in missed opportunities to detect, investigate, and halt the scheme over
several years. Deutsche Bank agreed to pay a $425 million fine and hire an
independent monitor pursuant to the consent order.47
The Federal Reserve Board also announced a $41 million penalty and
consent cease and desist order against the U.S. operations of Deutsche Bank
AG in January 2017 for AML deficiencies. In addition to identifying failures
by Deutsche Bank's U.S.-based banking operations to maintain an effective
program to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act and AML requirements, the
consent order required Deutsche Bank to improve senior management
oversight and controls and compliance with AML laws.48
45. Id.
46. Supra note 40.
47. N.Y. STATE DEPT.OF FIN. SERVS., Consent Order Under N.Y. Banking Law §§ 39, 44, 44-a
(2017), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/ea170130.pdf.
48. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve
Announces Two Enforcement Actions Against Deutsche Bank AG That Will Require Bank to Pay a
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In January 2017, the U.K.'s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) also fined
Deutsche Bank £163,076,224 for failing to maintain proper ANIL controls.
This is the largest penalty ever imposed by the FCA for failings concerning
ANIL controls. The FCA's Director of Enforcement and Market Oversight,
Mark Steward, explained "[t]he size of the fine reflects the seriousness of
Deutsche Bank's failings" and warned "[o]ther firms should take notice of
today's fine and look again at their own AIL procedures to ensure they do
49
not face similar action. "
B.

MERCHANTS BANK OF CALIFORNIA

FinCEN assessed a $7 million civil money penalty against Merchants
Bank of California in February 2017 for willfully violating the Bank Secrecy
Act.50 In addition to failing to establish and maintain an ANIL program,
Merchants Bank did not conduct proper due diligence on its foreign
correspondent accounts or report suspicious activity. Of note, FinCEN
found that Merchants failed to provide the necessary level of authority,
independence, and responsibility to its BSA officers and compliance staff.
Bank insiders interfered with compliance staffs efforts to investigate
suspicious activity related to insider-owned accounts; many of the
transactions were conducted on behalf of insider-owned MSBs. In the press
release, FinCEN asserts that these failures resulted in billions of dollars in
transactions that were not effectively monitored. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) also identified deficiencies in the
Bank's practices as well as violations of previous consent orders and assessed
its own $1 million civil money penalty against Merchants Bank.5'
C.

BANAMEX

USA

In May 2017, Banamex USA, a Los Angeles-based subsidiary of Citigroup,
Inc., agreed to forfeit nearly $100 million and enter into a non-prosecution
agreement to conclude a Department of Justice investigation into Banamex's
Combined $156.6 Million in Civil Money Penalties (April 20, 2017), available at https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/enforcement20170420a.htm.
49. Press Release, Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Fines Deutsche Bank £163 million for
Serious Anti-Money Laundering Controls Failings (Jan. 31, 2017) (on file with author), available at
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press -releases/fca-fines- deutsche -bank- 163 -million-anti-moneylaundering-controls -failure. See Letter of Final Notice from Financial Conduct Authority to
Deutsche Bank AG (Jan. 30, 2017) (on file with the Financial Conduct Authority), available at
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/deutsche-bank-2017.pdf.
50. Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCENPenalizes CaliforniaBank
for Egregious Violations of Anti-Money Laundering Laws (Feb. 27, 2017), available at https://
www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-penalizes-califomrnia-bank-egregious-violationsanti -money-laundering-laws.
51. Merchants Bank of California, N.A., No. 2017-02 (Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network Feb. 16, 2017) (Assessment Civil Money Penalty), available at https://www.fincen.gov/
sites/default/files/enforcement-action/201 7-2 2 7/Merchantso20Bank %20of%20Califomrnia
%20Assessment%20of%/20CMP /2002.24.2017.v2.pdf.
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alleged Bank Secrecy Act violations. Beginning in 2007 and until 2012,
Banamex processed over thirty million remittance transactions to Mexico
worth more than $8.8 billion for which Banamex's monitoring system issued
nearly 20,000 suspicious transaction alerts. But in response, Banamex
conducted less than ten investigations and only filed nine SARs.
Significantly, Banamex's limited and manual transaction monitoring system
produced paper reports; only two employees were responsible for reviewing
those reports in addition to their non-compliance obligations. Even as it
expanded its remittance processing business, Banamex did not address
control deficiencies or increase staffing. As part of the agreement, Banamex
admitted it failed to maintain an effective AML program with adequate
controls, polices, and procedures. Banamex also admitted it willfully failed
to file SARs.52
D.

HABIB BANK

In September 2017, the NYDFS fined Habib Bank, the largest bank in
Pakistan, $225 million for failure to comply with AML laws and regulations
at the bank's New York branch. At the conclusion of its investigation,
NYDFS determined the bank's serious failures in its AML compliance
function resulted in billions of dollars in transactions for a Saudi private
bank with reported links to al Qaeda. These transactions were facilitated by
a lack of proper AML controls, a failure to adequately identify customers of
the same private bank that might be using accounts at Habib bank to transfer
funds through New York, and the improper use of a "good guy" list to
enable transactions with an identified terrorist, potentially sanctioned
persons, and an international arms dealer. Significantly, the investigation
was undertaken pursuant to a December 2015 Consent Order that identified
previous deficiencies in the Bank's BSA/AML compliance program. The
NYDFS noted the Bank failed to rectify its deficiencies despite "more than
3
sufficient opportunity" to correct the problems5
E.

LONE STAR

FinCEN announced an assessment of a $2 million civil penalty against
Texas-based Lone Star National Bank in November 2017 for willful
violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. The Consent Order asserted that Lone
Star failed to establish and implement an adequate AML program, properly
conduct due diligence on a foreign correspondent account, and report
suspicious activities. Section 312 of the USA Patriot Act requires that U.S.
financial institution that establish, maintain, administer, or manage a
52. Letter from Deborah Connor, Acting Chief Money Laundering and Asset Recovery
Section, Dept. of Justice, to Brad Carp and Susanna Buergel, Banamex USA Criminal
Investigation (Mayl8, 2017) (on file with the Dept. of Justice), available at https://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/967871/download.

53. N.Y.

STATE DEPT.OF

FIN.

SERVS.,

Consent Order Under N.Y. Banking Law §§ 39, 44 and

605 (2017), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/eal70907.pdf.
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correspondent account in the U.S. for a foreign financial institution take
certain AML measures for those accounts. Lone Star's failure to comply
with Section 312 resulted in a foreign correspondent bank moving hundreds
of millions of U.S. dollars in suspicious cash shipments through the United
States. Among other deficiencies, Lone Star did not consider public
information about the foreign bank's alleged involvement in securities fraud
or verify information provided by the bank regarding the source of funds
and purpose of the account. FinCEN Acting Director Jamal El-Hindi stated
in the press release that, "(s)maller banks, just like the bigger ones, need to
fully understand and follow the 312 due diligence requirements if they open
accounts for foreign banks." He continued by noting that those risks are
54
manageable but should not be ignored.
F.

CREDIT SUISSE AND UNITED OVERSEAS BANK

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) imposed financial penalties
on Credit Suisse and United Overseas Bank (UOB) in May 2017 after
completing a two-year review of banks involved in dealings with iMalaysia
Development Berhad (1MDB), a government run strategic development
firm. 55 The investigation uncovered several breaches of AML requirements
and control inadequacies in violation of MAS Notice 626 - Prevention of
Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism. Specific
issues included lapses in conducting customer due diligence and inadequate
review of customer transactions. The MAS imposed fines of approximately
S$0.7 million on Credit Suisse and S$0.9 million on UOB. The MAS noted,
however, that the banks are currently taking steps to improve AML controls
and address the weaknesses uncovered in the investigation.56

54. Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, , FinCENPenalizesTexas Bank for
Violations ofAnti-Money Laundering Laws Focusing on Section 312 Due Diligence Violations (Nov. 1,

2017) (on file with author), available at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincenpenalizes -texas-bank-violations -anti-money-laundering-laws -focusing; See Lone Star National
Bank, Assessment of Civil Money Penalty, No. 2017-04 (Feb. 16, 2017) (Assessment Civil
Money Penalty), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement action/
2017-11 -01/Lone%2OStar.ASSESSMENT%200F% 20CIVIL% 20MONEY%20PENALTY
%20-%20Final%201 1.01_0.pdf.
55. In 2015, Malaysia's Prime Minister, Najib Tun Razak, was accused of channeling over
nearly 700 million U.S. dollars from 1MDB, a government-run strategic development
company, to his personal bank accounts. See generally Malaysia Controversy, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (last visited Jan. 29, 2017, 6:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/specialcoverage/malaysiacontroversy.
56. MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, Financial Penalties Imposed on Credit Suisse and
UOB for I-MDB Related Transactions (May 30, 2017), available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/Newsand-Publications/Enforcement-Actions/201 7/Financial-Penalties- Imposed-on- Credit- Suisse and-UOB -for- 1MDB -Related-Transactions.aspx.
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ALLIED IRISH BANKS PLC

In April 2017, the Central Bank of Ireland fined Allied Irish Banks Plc
(AIB) approximately 2.3 million Euro for breaches of anti-money laundering
and terrorist financing laws. According to AIB, the settlement with Central
Bank concerned issues dating from July 2010 to July 2014. During that
period, AIB failed to conduct proper due diligence on customers with
accounts that predated the first Irish AML laws, passed in 1995, and did not
report suspicious transactions without delay to the proper authorities. The
Central Bank said it also discovered breaches in AIB's AML policies and
procedures, including in its trade finance business.57
H.

BNP PARIBAS

In June 2017, Autorit6 de Contr6le Prudentiel et de R6solution (ACPR),
the French financial regulator, fined BNP Paribas _10 million following a
2015 inspection of the bank that revealed insufficient money laundering
controls. Specifically, the ACPR noted the bank did not have enough staff
responsible for detecting and reporting suspicious transactions. According
to the ACPR, BNP Paribas also lacked adequate tools for detecting unusual
customer transactions.58

I.

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

In August 2017, the Australian Transactions Reports & Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC), Australia's financial intelligence agency responsible for ANIL
and CFT, initiated civil proceedings against the Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (CBA) for the bank's failure to comply with ANIL and terrorist
financing laws on more than 53,700 occasions. AUSTRAC claims CBA did
not comply with its internal ANIL program and did not assess the money
laundering or terrorist financing risks of its intelligent deposit machines
(IDMs) for three years. CBA also allegedly did not provide timely reports to
AUSTRAC for 53,506 cash transactions conducted through IDMs that
exceeded the cash-reporting requirement from November 2012 to
57. Press Release, Central Bank of Ireland, Settlement Agreement between the Central Bank of
Ireland and Allied Irish Bank, p.l.c., (2017) (on file with author), available at https://
www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-source/news-and-media/legal-notices/settlement-agreements/
public-statement-relating-to-settlement-agreement-between-central-bank-of-ireland-andallied-irish-bank.pdf.
58. See Reuters staff, BNP Paribas fined over weaknesses in anti-money laundering controls,
REUTERS, (June 2, 2017, 12:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bnp-paribasmoneylaundering/bnp-paribas-fined-over-weaknesses-in-anti-money-laundering-controlsidUSKBN18T2JI; see also Silver Liisma, BNP Paribasfined EUR 10 million by ACPR for AML
failures, O.R.X., (June 7, 2017), https://managingrisktogether.orx.org/sites/default/files/
downloads/2017/07/orxnewsdigestofthemonthjune.pdf
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September 2015. CBA allegedly did not timely report, or report at all,
suspicious transactions that totaled more than $77 million. 59
J.

COUTTS & Co AG

In April 2017, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) imposed a
HK$7 million fine on the Hong Kong branch of Coutts & Co AG, for
failing to follow anti-money laundering rules. The fine stems from the
branch's conduct between 2012 and 2015. Following its investigation, the
HKMA determined Coutts violated five provisions of the Anti-Money
Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial Institutions)
Ordinance. The breaches included, among other things, a failure to
establish and maintain procedures for determining if customers were
politically exposed persons (PEP). The HKMA also indicated there were no
procedures for obtaining senior management approval to maintain
relationships with customers identified as PEPs.60
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority also ordered Coutts to
pay approximately $6.57 million in illegal profits from transactions in which
Coutts breached ANIL regulations by failing to conduct proper background
checks into business relationships associated with 1MDB.61
V.

Gaming

A. TABCORP
In March 2017, the Federal Court of Australia levied a record-setting civil
penalty against Tabcorp, an international gambling entertainment company,
for failing to have a compliant AML/CFT program. The $45 million civil
penalty resulted from the Federal Court's determination that Tabcorp
violated the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act
2006 on 108 occasions over a period of five years. The court also found
Tabcorp failed to provide AUSTRAC with reports about suspicious matters
on 105 different occasions and did not identify a customer who collected
$100,000 in winnings. Paul Jevtovic, the AUSTRAC CEO, noted the
"unprecedented civil penalty highlights AUSTRAC's resolve to take
enforcement action against reporting entities that engage in significant,
extensive and systemic non-compliance." Mr. Jevtovic urges all Boards and
59. Press Release, AUSTRACseeks civil penalty orders against CBA, ALSTRALIAN TRANSACTION
(August 3, 2017) (on file with author), available at http://

REPORTS AND ANALYSIS CENTRE

austrac.gov.au/media/media-releases/austrac-seeks-civil-penalty orders- against-cba.
60. Press Release, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, The Monetary AUSTRAC seeks civil
penalty orders against CBA, AUSTRAC (Apr. 11, 2017) (on file with author), available at http://
austrac.gov.au/media/media-releases/austrac-seeks-civil-penalty orders- against-cba.
61. Press Release, Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINVA sanctions Coutts for
IMDB breaches, FINMA (Feb. 2, 2017) (on file with author), available at https://www.finma.ch/
en/news/2017/02/20170202-mm-coutts/.
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senior management "to ensure that they are fully informed of their AML/
CFI' compliance."62

VI.
A.

Personal Liability
THOMAS HAIDER: MONEYGRAM INTERNATIONAL INC.'S EXCHIEF COMPLIANCE OFFICER

In May 2017, Thomas Haider, MoneyGram International Inc.'s former
Chief Compliance Officer, agreed to a three-year injunction barring him
from acting in a compliance function for any money transmitter. As part of
the settlement with FinCEN and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
Southern District of New York, Haider also agreed to pay a $250,000
penalty. In 2014, U.S. authorities sued Haider, seeking a $1 million civil
penalty and to hold him personally liable for failing to stop fraudulent
transfers and other violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. As part of the
settlement, Haider admitted and accepted responsibility for numerous
violations, including failing to implement a policy for terminating outlets
that posed high fraud risks and structuring MoneyGram's ANIL program
such that analysts responsible for filing SARs with FinCEN did not see
information aggregated by MoneyGram's Fraud Department. The case has
been considered as a test of the U.S. government's increasing focus on
punishing individuals for institutional compliance shortfalls. "Holding
[Haider] personally accountable strengthens the compliance profession by
demonstrating that behavior like this is not tolerated within the ranks of
compliance professionals," acting FinCEN Director Jamal El-Hindi said.
FinCEN asserts that this is one of the largest fines ever imposed on an
individual.63

B. JOHN D. TELFER: WINDSOR STREET CAPITAL AML
COMPLIANCE OFFICER

In early 2017, the SEC charged Windsor Street Capital and its antimoney laundering officer, John D. Telfer, with securities violations
regarding the unregistered sale of hundreds of millions of penny stock shares
without adequate due diligence. According to the SEC, Telfer failed to file
62. Press Release, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Record $45 million civil
penalty ordered against Tabcorp, AUSTRAC (Mar. 16, 2017) (on file with author), available at
http://www.austrac.gov.au/medialmedia-releases/record-45 -million-civil-penalty-orderedagainst-tabcorp.
63. Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN and Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Announce Settlement with Former MoneyGram Executive Thomas E.Haider, FINCEN
(May 4, 2017) (on file with author), available at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/
fincen-and- manhattan-us- attorney-announce -settlement-former-moneygram- executive; see
Reuters staff, Former MoneyGram executive settles closely watched U.S. money laundering case,
REUTERS, (May 4, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moneygram-intlmoneylaundering/former-moneygram-executive- settles-closely-watched-u-s -moneylaundering-case-idUSKBN1802P3.
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SARs for nearly $25 million in suspicious penny stock sale transactions
beginning in 2013, despite multiple red flags alerting him to the fraudulent
scheme. Although Telfer neither admitted nor denied any wrongdoing,
pursuant to the terms of his settlement in June 2017, he agreed to be barred
from the securities industry and pay a $10,000 penalty.64
C.

RONALD B. NIcKLAus: PENNALUNA & CoMPANY AML OFFICER

In February 2017, Ronald B. Nicklas, the former AML Officer of
Pennaluna & Company (Pennaluna) and FINRA signed a Letter of
Acceptance and Waiver and Consent (AWC) for failing to establish and
implement an AML program "reasonably designed to detect and cause the
reporting of suspicious activity." During his term as an AML Officer,
Pennaluna accepted deposits and subsequently facilitated the sale of millions
of shares of securities priced under $5 on eight customer accounts for
proceeds totaling just over $1.5 million; three of the five accounts were
owned by the same customer. But while Niklas served as the AML Officer,
Pennluna failed to identify any red flags or to investigate suspicious
transactions. Nicklas consented to a four-month suspension from
association with all FINRA members in all principal capacities and a $ 10,000
fine.65

VI.
A.

Broker Dealers
WELLS FARGO ADVISORS, LLC

On November 13, 2017, Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC entered into a
settlement agreement with the Securities and Exchange Commission
regarding suspicious activity reporting.66 Between March 2012 and June
2013, Wells Fargo failed to file fifty SARs concerning activity occurring in
U.S. branch offices that focused on international customers. 67 Notably, for a
majority of the reports, Wells Fargo failed to file timely SARS on continuing
activities that had already been reported by Wells Fargo Advisors. Although
Wells Fargo Advisors did not admit or deny guilt, it agreed to a cease and
desist order, censure, and to pay a $3.5 million penalty.68
B.

WINDSOR STREET CAPITAL,

L.P.

OnJuly 28, 2017, the SEC issued an order for Windsor Street Capital L.P
(Windsor), to pay $200,000 in fines for violating the Exchange Act Section
17(a) and Rule 17a-8. In addition, Windsor was directed to obtain an
64. File No. 3-17813, SEC Settlement Bars FormerAnti-Money LaunderingOjficerfor Gatekeeper
Failures, SEC (June 12, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/34-80908-s.pdf.
65. Disciplinary and Other FINRA Actions, at 13, FINRA (Dec. 2017), available at https://
www.finra.org/sites/default/files/publication-file/December_2017-Disciplinary-Actions.pdf.
66. In the matter of Wells FargoAdvisors, LLC, no. 3-18279, 2017 VL 5248280 (Nov. 13, 2017).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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independent consultant to review and recommend mandatory enhancements
to the firm's AML policies and procedures. The Order noted that even
though Windsor's AML program identified red flags that triggered an
investigation, Windsor failed to file SARs for $24.8 million of potentially
illegal stock sales conducted by its customers that met the red flag criteria.69
C.

ALPINE SECURITIES CORPORATION

On June 5, 2017, the SEC filed a complaint against Alpine Securities
Corporation (Alpine) for alleged systematic failure to file SARs for stock
transactions that were flagged as suspicious, in violation of the Exchange Act
Section 17(a) and Rule 17a-8. The SEC's complaint stated that Alpine
omitted from the SARs information supporting the determination to file.
Additionally, even though Alpine was aware of a 2012 FINRA's finding that
its SARs narratives were inadequate; Alpine did not take any meaningful
70
corrective action.
D.

MARrVA CAPITAL MARKETS

In an AWC signed by Mariva Capital Markets (Mariva) on May 15, 2017,
FINRA found that Mariva failed to establish and implement an AML
program, "reasonably tailored" to Mariva's business, in violation of FINRA
Rule 3310 (a). Between late 2013 and early 2015, Mariva facilitated trading
of more than $1 billion in Argentinian debt on behalf of a foreign financial
institution's affiliate. Although Mariva had an AML program that
contemplated general red flags, the program was not designed to detect
potentially suspicious activity in the affiliate's account. FINRA found that
Mariva's AML program was inadequate and, as a result, Mariva failed to
conduct enhanced due diligence on the affiliate's account sufficient to
understand the purpose of the account, and anticipate the bond activity.
FINRA and Mariva agreed to a censure and a $100,000 fine. 71
E.

SPARTAN SECURITIES GROUP, LTD.

Similarly, in July 2017, Spartan Securities Group Ltd (Spartan) agreed to
pay $100,000 for failing to establish and implement an AML program
reasonably designed to achieve compliance with BSA. FINRA pointed out
that while Spartan conducted trade reviews, it did not have an AML
69. See In the Matter of Windsor Street CapitalL.P. (f/k/a Meyers Ass., L.P.) & Telfer, Exchange
Act No. 10392, 2017 WL 3214439 (July 28, 2017). (Order Making Findings And Imposing
Remedial Sanctions And A Cease-And-Desist Order Pursuant To Section 8a Of The Securities
Act Of 1933 And Sections 15(B) And 21c Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934 As To
Windsor Street Capital, L.P.)
70. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Alpine Securities Corp., no. Complaint and Jury
Demand (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (ECF case).
71. FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent to Mariva Capital Markets, LLC, No.
2015043415301, FINRA (May 9, 2017) available at http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/
fda documents/2015043415301 FDA_ L678098.pdf.
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program responsive to Spartan's particular business and capable of
aggregating the information necessary to trigger ANIL red flags and detect
patterns of suspicious activity. FINRA pointed to several instances where
multiple red flags were present, but Spartan failed to investigate the
transaction or file a SAR.72
F.

VALDES & MORENO, INC.

In April 2017, an AWC signed by Valdes & Moreno Inc. of Kansas City,
Missouri imposed a $20,000 fine for failure to adequately review and
investigate potentially suspicious activity. Specifically, V&M failed to
adequately review and investigate potentially suspicious activity involving
one customer who engaged in ten securities transactions involving the stocks
of ten microcap issuers that demonstrated red flags characteristic of a pump
and dump scheme. V&M also failed to conduct required due diligence on its
single correspondent account for a foreign financial broker-dealer.
Additional ANIL program deficiencies included no documented evidence of
risk assessments, enhanced due diligence determinations, or the periodic
73
review of correspondent accounts.
G.

WooD COMPANY INC.

In March 2017, FINRA issued a decision on a formal complaint against
Wood Company Inc. (Wood), for failure to implement and enforce its ANIL
procedures and conduct adequate independent ANIL tests, in violation of
FINRA Rules 3310 and 2010. More specifically, Wood hired a broker with
a history of disciplinary actions, Edwin Quinones, and then failed to subject
him to heightened oversight, to detect and investigate red flags for penny
stock trades he executed, and adequately respond to red flags raised by its
clearing firm, Pershing. In March 2009, one year after Quinones was hired,
Pershing began alerting Wood to trades in Quinones' accounts. Wood's
ANIL Officer initially ignored the inquiry, but later forwarded the email to
Quinones. In response, Quinones provided incomplete answers to Pershing.
FINRA stated in its decision that the question is not whether the trading
constituted a "pump and dump" scheme, but rather, whether the red flags
were sufficient to necessitate further investigation. FINRA imposed a
$73,000 fine on Wood and prohibited it from liquidating penny stocks in
74
new accounts for a period of two years.
72. FINRA Order Accepting Offer of Settlement to Spartan Securities Group, Ltd., no.
2013036389101, FINRA (July 11, 2017), available at https://www.finra.org/sites/defaultlfiles/
fda documents/2013036389101 FDARB7X3580.pdf.
73. FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent to Valdes & Moreno, Inc., No.
20160482443301, FINRA (Apr.25, 2017).
74. Wood (Arthur W) Co. Inc., 2017 VL 3434112 (N.A.S.D.R.) (March 15, 2017).
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WESTON FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC

More recently in September 2017, Weston Financial Services LLC signed
an AWC agreeing to a censure and fine of $20,000 for failing to produce
information requested by FinCEN pursuant to BSA regulation 31 C.F.R.
1010.520 which incorporates section 314(a) of the USA PATRIOT ACT.T5
This regulation authorizes "[a] law enforcement agency investigating
terrorist activity or money laundering to request that FinCEN solicit, on the
investigating agency's behalf, certain information from a financial institution
or a group of financial institutions"76

75. FINRA Letter of Acceptance, Waiver and Consent Weston Financial Services LLC, No.
2013035268401, FINRA (Sept.27, 2017).
76. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.520 (2011).
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